Standard histories of Major General William T. Such broad generalizations may assuage wounded Southern pride, but they also rewrite history. On September 25 he reached Palmetto, Ga.
Palmetto was then headquarters for General John B. Hood, commanding the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Just two months earlier Davis had bumped Hood up the seniority ladder to take over the army after General Joseph E. Hood quickly launched a series of fierce offensive strikes at the Union forces enfolding the city. None succeeded in halting the enemy, however, and Atlanta was abandoned on September 1. Hood did have another plan, which, considering his situation, was about as good as could be expected.
Hood planned to strike at exposed portions of the Federal force, but only when the odds favored him. Should Sherman not play along—by choosing to thrust southward through Georgia instead—Hood would then harry his rear. William J. Davis also met with Lt. On October 3 Davis met with Beauregard in Augusta.
It was not a comfortable occasion, since the two had quarreled bitterly over issues of strategy and resources. His duties would be largely administrative, leaving it to others to command in the field. Beauregard eagerly accepted the new position, afterward insisting that Davis had promised him the cooperation of the Confederate War Department. Rebel operations began on September 29, when Hood started marching his army counterclockwise around Atlanta. Two days later a Rebel division nearly captured Allatoona Pass, a natural choke point in the Federal supply route.
Sherman reacted according to expectations by taking most of his troops out of Atlanta to chase after Hood. So far, so good. Believing that Hood enjoyed a direct sanction from Davis, Beauregard was reluctant to press the issue and limited his role to that of adviser and facilitator.
Not that Hood was interested in his advice as he made changes to the Davis-approved plan. Instead of bobbing, weaving and jabbing to foil his opponent, Hood began thinking of striking into Tennessee to capture its Federal-occupied capital, Nashville.
Toward that end, Hood marched west and north to close on the Tennessee border. Soon he was well out of Georgia, with Sherman between him and the heart of the state. But Sherman quickly reversed course, returned to Atlanta and, on November , moved his armies out of the city in two large columns, or wings, on routes both east and southeast.
Hood was not in position to pursue. In early November he freed up the cavalry assigned to Hood under Maj. Joseph Wheeler by replacing it with the Tennessee-based command of Maj.
Nathan Bedford Forrest. Sherman, however, had begun his march before that transfer was completed. In Macon, Maj. Search this Guide Search. This guide provides access to material related to "Sherman's March to the Sea" in the Chronicling America digital collection of historic newspapers. About Chronicling America Chronicling America is a searchable digital collection of historic newspaper pages from sponsored jointly by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Library of Congress.
Included in the website is the Directory of US Newspapers in American Libraries , a searchable index to newspapers published in the United States since , which helps researchers identify what titles exist for a specific place and time, and how to access them. Introduction Illustration of General Sherman leading his army. They believed that they could win the war by simply not losing, similarly to how the American Revolutionaries won their independence from Great Britain.
Sherman had the opposite in mind. Doing so would weaken the ability of General Robert E. They tore apart buildings, mills, factories, and houses then burned them when they were done. This shortened the war as General Lee could not afford to maintain the fight against General Grant. Prior to his campaign, the civilian population of the Confederacy this far South had been virtually untouched by the war.
They continued to be very supportive of the war and had hopes of victory. Through this march, Sherman wanted to show the people of the South that the Confederacy could not protect them from the Union. He thought that if he could inflict the psychological hardships of war on to the people of the South, he could break Southern morale and support for the war. Whether Sherman approved of their behavior or not, the result was the same.
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